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et al.: Book Review

Book Review
Richard A. Watson and Rondal G. Downing: The Politics of the
Bench and the Bar, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1969, pp. xx, 393
The authors are members of the Department of Political Science of
the University of Missouri. They present a comprehensive study of the
"Missouri Plan" for the selection of judges as it has operated from the time
of its adoption in 1940, through the end of 1964. The book is replete with
tables and statistics, and with material gathered from questionnaires and
in interviews. The product is of great value to students of the processes of
judicial selection.
The authors undertake to answer the difficult question of whether
judges appointed under the plan are "better" than those chosen in partisan
elections. The study employs five statistical compilations as follows: (1)
lawyer evaluation of quality; (2) lawyer evaluation of impartiality; (8)
standing in bar polls; (4) standing in popular vote in retention; and (5)
affirmance-reversal record. The authors concede that the use of the lastmentioned factor may be subject to question since the judge who is too
afraid of reversal may be lacking in initiative. They do not use another
factor which other students of judicial merit have employed-the number
of cases disposed. The explanation is that "quality" is more important than
"quantity." Yet the volume figure might have been helpful as an additional
factor, for ability to move the docket is important.
The conclusion is clearly and definitely favorable to the plan, although
not overwhelmingly so. The authors state that even lawyers who are opposed to the plan seem to prefer "plan" judges to pre-plan ones. The authors find no support for some of the predictions made about the plan when
it was under consideration. There is nothing to indicate that plan judges
are more "conservative" than elected judges, or that the appointed judges
are chosen in undue proportions from among graduates of the "prestige"
law schools. It also appears that the plan has put an end to the selection of
"very bad" judges.
The skeptic might say that the study fails to show any wide margin of
superiority for judges appointed under the plan, when compared to judges
of the same courts who had been elected and were serving at the time the
plan was adopted. Such a contention should be evaluated in light of present-day political conditions and the calibre of judges they would produce.
The expense of running for election has increased year after year. In a
partisan election a candidate must have organizational support in order to
have any chance in a big-city primary. In times of full employment qualified lawyers are reluctant to stand for judicial office in contested elections.
In light of the above factors, it is fair to say that competent judges have
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been appointed under the plan, and that there is no reason to believe that
a return to political election would produce improvement.
A large part of the study is devoted to a discussion of the "politics" of
judicial selection. The authors restate the true but trite proposition that
the plan does not eliminate politics in judicial selection but merely substitutes one type of politics for another. They then enter into a detailed analysis of the plan in operation, relying to a great extent upon interviews and
answers to questionnaires. The conclusions are interesting but must be received with reservations.
The authors discuss various "games" of panel stacking, described as
"wiring," "rigging," and "loading," and intimate that these games are engaged in frequently in the selection process. This would indicate a cavalier
attitude among the commission members. Let us examine the authors'
claims.
A panel is said to be "wired" if the governor has made his wishes
known to the commission and the commission obliges by nominating the
man the governor has expressed an interest in. The authors say that
they are
unable to find any reliable evidence that governors as a general
practice convey their wishes in appointments to lay commissioners
either directly or through intermediaries, although there is little
question that this has occurred on certain occasions ....
(p. 47.)
Even if the governor did make his preference known, there is no particular
reason why the attorneys and members of the bench who comprise the
commission would feel obliged to accommodate him. On some occasions,
indeed, gubernatorial pressure has worked to the candidate's disadvantage.
Nor does a communication of the governor's desires from a self-appointed
emissary of the governor prove the case. Politicians regularly play the game
of name-dropping. So the appearance on a panel of a lawyer who is known
to stand well with the governor does not provide reason for criticism of
the commission. There is also the possibility that the panelist may have
good qualifications and may have delayed making his availability known
until a friendly governor took office. If the nominee is qualified, is the
commission not justified in certifying him and placing the responsibility on
the governor?
Another game is that of "rigging," which consists of certifying a panel
of nominees in which one member is certain to be appointed. A "rigged"
panel is not necessarily one which is pleasing to the governor. It might
consist of one member barely tolerable and two quite objectionable to the
governor. The vice in rigging is that the commission usurps the appointment prerogative of the governor by not providing him with a real choice.
It is often easy to say, with hindsight, that a panel is "rigged" because
it contains only one logical appointee, but this may not be the case at all.
Sometimes one panelist will be much better known than the others, and,
if he is also on good terms with the governor, his appointment may seem a
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foregone conclusion. Yet his qualifications may be such that the commission
had every justification for including him as one of the three nominees.
The supposed rigging might well be the work of a single commission
member. Let us suppose that Commissioner A is anxious to promote the
candidacy of X, a well-qualified lawyer of Democratic antecedents but without political connections. Suppose also that other commissioners are impressed by Y, also a well-qualified Democrat. A knows of an ancient grievance which the governor has against Y. A might be able to persuade the
commission to tender a panel consisting of X, Y, and a Republican. Those
who know all the details will say that this panel is rigged. Yet the rigging
is the work of a single commissioner and the others will hotly and truthfully deny any charge that they tried to dictate the appointment. When only
three men are named to the panel there is always some opportunity for
maneuvering, but this is no reason to conclude that such maneuvering has
dominated the selection process.
The third game is referred to as "loading," and consists of the selection
of panels in which all members have a common characteristic: three Republicans, three Democrats, three Catholics, etc. The study makes reference
to a "notorious" instance in which three Republicans were certified for a
court of appeals vacancy. Why, one might ask, is the incident notorious?
Might not a commission feel that a particular court was dominated by
Democrats to such an extent that an appointment should be made from
the other party? So long as governors think politically, commissioners may
be tempted to do so also. Or might a commission not think that a minority
group should have representation on a multi-judge court? So long as all
panelists are qualified, it is hard to see that the commission has a duty to
diversify.
The authors further make the valid point that any consideration of
the Missouri Plan must give attention to the governor's role. Recent Missouri governors have had a strong political orientation and generally have
operated on the assumption that only persons with the proper political
credentials in addition to the necessary statutory qualifications may hold
public office. The spoils system has been strictly adhered to. If the governor's choice in filling bench vacancies was not limited to a panel of three
men nominated by the commission, vacancies would be filled with allies of
the governor. And those appointed under this spoils system approach,
would probably be able to secure election, if experience in other states is a
reliable guide. The court plan restricts the governor's freedom of choice
but there is still the tendency to assess the political implications of the
panel nominees. If future governors would indicate that they will give
primary attention to merit, and less attention to politics, confidence in the
court plan would be greatly increased and discussion of panel-stacking
games would abate.
There is additional ground for criticism of the study in the authors' use
of the interview material. They neither identify the persons interviewed,
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nor do they identify the judges and unsuccessful panel members who are
discussed by the interviewees. No doubt it is best not to include these identifications, but this makes checking for accuracy virtually impossible. Thus,
many of the authors' assertions stand without authoritative weight and are
subject to serious question. For example, at page 65, the authors make the
statement that "on one occasion, three attorneys went to the nominating
commission on behalf of a colleague, only to end up themselves on the
panel as the three nominees." This assertion seems unlikely. Commissions
do not ordinarily hold sessions where lawyers may "go to" them. The
authors are reporting what somebody told them. There is no possibility of
checking.
At page 144 the authors discuss a supposed outstate influence in appointments to the St. Louis Circuit Court, and report as follows: "It is said
that many judges have formerly lived outstate; indeed, some are acccused
of having moved to St. Louis solely in order to seek a circuit judgeship." A
look at the bluebooks shows that of the 22 judges appointed to the St.
Louis Circuit Court under the plan, only two had practiced in outstate
Missouri. One came to St. Louis in 1919 and was appointed in 1945. The
other came to the city in 1942 and became a judge in 1955. Sixteen of the
appointees were natives of St. Louis. The authors have perpetuated an idle
rumor which should have been checked.
On page 190 the authors present an instance of supposed gubernatorial
"retaliation" against the appellate commission for "shamefully loading
panels.. ." and report the statement of an interviewee that one panel was
"so bad" that the governor "made his appointment with an eye to . . .
affronting the Chief Justice and the nominating commission. . .

."

There

has been no appellate appointment since the plan has been in effect which
could properly be described as an "affront" to the commission which named
the panel. Nor does this reviewer know of any consistent practice of "loading" panels which could appropriately be characterized as "shameful."
The authors, when reporting this statement, should have indicated that it
is only one man's opinion. Instead, it is set out in the text without comment. The foregoing examples lead one to conclude that the authors have
not fully met their responsibility of verifying the reliability of the statements made by interviewees by determining whether particular statements
represent views of some currency or are simply individual opinions.
It is also unfortunate that the study, although not published until
1969, does not deal in any way with the years after 1964. During this fiveyear period a two-term governor has emerged, almost all pre-plan judges
have been replaced, there has been an increased selection of younger men,
and Supreme Court appointments among commissioners of the Court has
virtually ceased (although commissioners are included on the panels with
some regularity). There should at least have been a summary supplemental
chapter of these developments even if the authors were unable to apply
their detailed study methods to the intervening years.
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The authors do point up many questions which will be significant in
the future. Do the commissions seek to present panels consisting of the best
available lawyers, or are they diverted by extraneous and irrelevant considerations? Can the governors be persuaded to think less about politics and
more about the need for able judges? Has the plan succeeded reasonably
well, in spite of its accidents? Should it be extended? Is there any conceivable reason to think that any other method would be better? Those who
are interested in the quality of the courts must ask these questions, and the
Watson-Downing study should help them.
CHARL~s B. BLAcsbA*

*A.B., Princeton University, 1942; J.D., University of Michigan, 1948; Admitted to Missouri Bar, 1948; Practice, Kansas City, Missouri, 1948-1966; Professor
of Law, St. Louis University since 1966.
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